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I. Introduction 
The chapter examines the capacity of the European Court of Human Rights (henceforth ECtHR 
or ‘the Court’) to establish a social minimum of welfare provisions that states would owe to all 
individuals within their jurisdiction. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a 
human rights treaty primarily aimed towards the protection of civil and political rights.1 The 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, however, has demonstrated that a strict distinction between first 
generation (civil and political), and second generation (economic, social and cultural) rights is 
outdated.2 The Court seems to embrace the theory of the indivisibility of rights and has argued 
that the mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention may require the state to provide 
socioeconomic assistance is not in itself a reason against such an interpretation.3 To that end, 
the obligations states have to secure the effective enjoyment of ECHR rights,4 in conjunction 
with the Court’s approach to interpreting the Convention in light of its objective and purpose,5 
have opened up ‘gateways’6 for the civil and political rights protected in the ECHR to generate 
socioeconomic obligations on states. Relying on the doctrine of positive obligations in relation 
to various Convention articles,7 the Court has succeeded in identifying certain limited 
Convention-based socioeconomic duties to which states must adhere.   
Nevertheless, the ECtHR’s case law relating to socioeconomic rights is to a large extent 
characterised by timidity and deference to the respondent state.8 The circumstances in which 
                                                          
*Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter, UK. 
1 Some rights that would fall under the umbrella of socio-economic rights are also protected in the ECHR, 
including the right to education protected under Article 2 Protocol 1 ECHR. See also the chapter by Leijten in this 
volume. 
2 See for instance Airey v Ireland (App. Νο. 6289/73, 9 October 1979) para 26. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Colm O'Cinneide, A Modest Proposal: Destitution, State Responsibility and the European Convention on Human 
Rights (August 30, 2008). Available on SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1370241 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1370241  
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Primarily Articles 2, 3, 6, 8, 14 and Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR. See indicatively Ellie Palmer, Beyond Arbitrary 
Interference: The Right to a Home? Developing Socio-economic Duties in the European Court of Human Rights, 
61 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly pp 225-43 (2010). 
8 It is not uncommon for a case that requires substantial reallocation of resources to be declared inadmissible as 
manifestly ill-founded. See for instance Botta v Italy (App. No. 21439/93, dec, 24 February 1998); Zahnalova and 
Zehnal v Czech Republic App. No 38621/97, dec, 14 May 2002); Sentges v Netherlands (App. Νο. 27677/02, dec, 
8 July 2003). On the approach of the ECtHR to socio-economic rights see indicatively I Leijten, Core Socio-
Economic Rights and the European Court of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2017) and Ida Elisabeth 
Koch, Human Rights as Indivisible Rights: The Protection of Socio-Economic Demands under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009). 
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the Convention will require states to adopt ‘socioeconomic’ measures are exceptional, as the 
Court does not view itself as a forum for socioeconomic litigation nor as a protector against 
poverty and destitution.9 Additionally, the few judgments where the Court has found that the 
state owed socioeconomic duties to the applicant are characterised by a lack of uniformity,10 
thus hampering the development of a principled approach to socioeconomic jurisprudence at 
the ECtHR. 
  This chapter contributes to a specific dimension of the debate on the ECtHR’s capacity 
to protect socioeconomic interests and to generate a social minimum of welfare protection. 
Building on the chapter by Leijten in this volume, it examines the relationship between the 
state’s positive obligations in the socioeconomic sphere and the applicant’s ‘vulnerability’. 
Vulnerability, the state of being ‘open and exposed to hurts and harms of various kinds’11 has 
begun to feature prominently in the ECtHR’s case-law, including in cases with a 
socioeconomic dimension. This chapter argues that vulnerability can serve as a useful 
normative justification for the Court to be less deferential to the respondent state and to 
interpret the Convention in a manner that generates obligations in the direction of a social 
minimum. Additionally, the chapter discusses the limitations of vulnerability analysis in this 
context and makes suggestions on how this tool could be developed to further build a path 
towards a social minimum under the ECHR. 
The arguments will be developed as follows. Part II establishes the meaning of a 
minimum core obligation. This will serve as the basis to determine whether there is any 
indication that the ECtHR could generate a similar obligation under the Convention. Part III 
examines the nature of positive obligations in human rights law and explains how these have 
affected the Court’s approach in its socioeconomic case law. Emphasis will be placed on the 
fact that positive obligations are obligations of means. They require states to take steps to 
protect rightsholders from threats to their rights that are attributable to third parties or general 
situations. The appropriate steps the state must take vary depending on the circumstances of 
the case and what could reasonably be expected of the state in dealing with the situation before 
it. Therefore, the chapter concludes that these are obligations that are subjective as they vary 
among states. In the socioeconomic sphere, the Court has granted states a particularly wide 
margin of appreciation to determine how they will allocate their resources and it has been 
reluctant to inflate the scope of positive obligations in a manner that would create onerous 
financial duties for the contracting parties. Part IV examines instances where the Court, in spite 
of the subjective nature of positive obligations has demanded socioeconomic provisions from 
states but in a manner that is objective, namely where they are the same for all states and must 
be immediately complied with, regardless of the specific capabilities of each state. The Court 
has set such objective socio-economic standards where the applicant is a member of what the 
Court considers to be a vulnerable group and is wholly reliant on state support for her 
subsistence. In such cases, the Court will demand that the basic needs of the vulnerable 
individual are met by the state regardless of the wide margin of appreciation the Court usually 
grants where the state’s capacity to allocate its resources is concerned. The chapter argues that 
                                                          
9 See Pancenko v Latvia (App. No. 40772/98, dec, 28 October 2009) para 2. 
10 On this see Janneke Gerards, ‘The ECtHR’s Response to Fundamental Rights Issues Related to Financial and 
Economic Difficulties – the Problem of Compartmentalisation’ (2015) 33 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
pp 274-92. 
11 Mary Neal, ‘Not Gods but Animals: Human Dignity and Vulnerable Subjecthood’ (2012) 33 Liverpool Law 
Review pp 186-187. 
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the vulnerability criterion is a tool the Court can rely on to transform what would normally be 
subjective obligations into objective standards of protection that are meant to apply across all 
state parties to the ECHR. This, however, does not generate a social minimum that would 
protect all from destitution, as the protection is available exclusively to the members of specific 
groups that the ECtHR has identified as vulnerable. Part V discusses whether expanding the 
notion of vulnerability to encompass a greater number of individuals in need could become the 
normative justification the Court relies on to demand social minimum protection from state 
parties to the ECHR. The chapter concludes that while some expansion of the concept would 
be useful, the Court is rightfully wary of inflating it. An approach that reconciles the group 
dimension of vulnerability with the individual needs of the applicant could be the best path the 
Court could follow towards recognising a social minimum of protection while also protecting 
its legitimacy. 
II.  Minimum Core Obligations in International Human Rights Law 
The protection states are expected to provide to socioeconomic rights in international human 
rights law is closely linked to the concept of ‘progressive realisation’.12 In the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, this duty to progressively realise 
socioeconomic rights is connected to the ‘available resources’13 the state has at its disposal. 
Thus, the state is not expected to guarantee that all socioeconomic demands will be fulfilled 
instantaneously. Instead, it must demonstrate that it is working towards the full realisation of 
the right by taking concrete steps in that direction. Alongside the obligation to progressively 
realise rights, states have an obligation to immediately fulfil a certain minimum of 
socioeconomic demands regardless of their resources. These represent the minimum core of 
the right. This core is primarily14 understood to be inviolable, non-derogable, and must be 
fulfilled regardless of the subjective capabilities of the state.15 Thus, even states with limited 
resources must give priority to the fulfilment of their minimum core socioeconomic duties.  
In his analysis of such minimum core obligations, Tasioulas argues that they possess 
three key characteristics. Firstly, minimum core obligations are characterised by their 
immediacy; ‘they demand immediate compliance’ rather than progressive realisation from the 
state.16 A second characteristic is their completeness, which requires states to ensure that 
minimum core demands are ‘fully complied with at any given time’.17 Thirdly, minimum core 
obligations are understood to be universal ‘in that they bind all states’.18 In relation to this final 
criterion, Tasioulas additionally recognises that these obligations bind all states in the same 
                                                          
12 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res 2200 (XXI) A (UN Doc A/6316) 
(Dec. 16, 1966) Article 2. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Some also argue that it is not an absolute standard based on the wording in UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 
1, of the Covenant), 14 December 1990, E/1991/23 para 10. 
15 See Diane Desierto, Public Policy in International Economic Law: The ICESCR in Trade, Finance, and 
Investment (Oxford University Press, 2015) pp 68-179. 
16 John Tasioulas, ‘Minimum Core Obligations: Human Rights in the Here and Now’ (2017) pp 20 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/908171515588413853/pdf/122563-WP-Tasioulas2-PUBLIC.pdf . 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  
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way, namely their content is understood to be ‘invariant across states’.19 Thus, while 
progressive realisation creates subjective standards on the states as it is linked to their available 
resources, minimum core obligations are primarily seen as objective in nature and are the same 
for all states irrespective of the state’s wealth. This understanding of minimum core obligations 
seems to mirror discussions in political philosophy of a social minimum which Waldron defines 
as ‘a level of material well-being beneath which no-one should be permitted to fall’.20  
While the ECHR does not include explicit references to progressive realisation and the 
ECtHR does not employ this terminology, its approach arguably recognises the subjectivity of 
positive obligations. The following section will illustrate the approach the Court has developed 
before proceeding in the remainder of this chapter to assess instances where the Court has 
tentatively departed from such an analysis to identify a minimum core-type duty on the state 
by relying on the applicant’s vulnerability.    
III.  The subjective nature of Positive Obligations the case law of the ECtHR 
Human rights obligations under international law are not limited to the negative type of 
protection that traditionally is synonymous with civil and political rights, and call upon the 
state to refrain from any unwarranted interference with the enjoyment of a right.21 They also 
develop a positive dimension which requires the state to act preventatively and protect the 
individual from wrongful acts that threaten the enjoyment of her rights and are attributable to 
third persons or general situations.22 In such cases, even though the prejudice to the right is not 
directly attributable to the state, the state is still required to take all necessary steps to protect 
the rights-holder. These steps depending on the circumstances may include an obligation to 
provide redress to the victim of a violation by a third party, to carry out an effective 
investigation,23 to provide material assistance to the rights-holder or to punish the third-party 
wrongdoer. This positive dimension of rights is where the duty to provide socioeconomic 
assistance would arise, as the state would be required to take action, or at least not to remain 
passive, in order protect the rights-holder from a situation of destitution that could violate her 
rights.  
However, the duty of the state when its positive obligations are under examination is to 
take steps to protect the rights-holder. All the state must demonstrate is that, given the 
exigencies of the situation, it was diligent in mobilising its resources to the best of its abilities 
to fulfil its duty to protect. It does not have an obligation to succeed in protecting the rights-
holder.24 There are further prerequisites for this duty of the state to act to be triggered. For 
                                                          
19 Ibid at 23. Some scholars see it as a variable standard. See for instance Craig Scott and Philip Alston, 
‘Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and 
Grootboom’s Promise’ (2000) 16 South African Journal of Human Rights pp 206-68. 
20 Jeremy Waldron, ‘John Rawls and the Social Minimum’ (1986) 1 Journal of Applied Philosophy 21, 21. 
21 Civil and political rights, however, also generate positive obligations under the Convention, see Alastair 
Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations Under the European Convention on Human Rights by the 
European Court of Human Rights (Hart, 2004). 
22 Ibid. See also Laurens Lavrysen, Human Rights in a Positive State (Intersentia, 2016).  
23 See for instance Nachova and others v Bulgaria (App. Nos 43577/98 43579/98, 6 July 2005). 
24 For a thorough account of positive obligations and the state’s duty of due diligence see ILA Study Group on 
Due Diligence in International Law, First Report Duncan French (Chair) and Tim Stephens (Rapporteur) 
published 7 March 2014 pg 16, www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/8AC4DFA1- 4AB6-4687-
A265FF9C0137A699 . 
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instance, the state must have known (or ought to have known) of the danger to which the rights-
holder was exposed.25 
Once it is established that a duty of the state to protect exists, the Court must then define 
the scope of this obligation. What must the state have done to protect the rights-holder in the 
specific circumstances? The tools the Court relies on to respond to this question are helpfully 
summarised in an oft-cited passage from the Court’s Grand Chamber judgment in Ilaşcu and 
Others v. Moldova and Russia.26 In this judgment, the Court asserted that  
In determining the scope of a State’s positive obligations, regard must be had to 
the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest and the interests 
of the individual, the diversity of situations obtaining in Contracting States and the 
choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources. Nor must these 
obligations be interpreted in such a way as to impose an impossible or 
disproportionate burden.27 
From this passage, there are three key conclusions we can infer that can inform the 
discussion on the state’s positive obligation to provide a socioeconomic protection under the 
ECHR. Firstly, the scope of the positive obligation is subjective to each state, owing to the 
diversity of situations to which the contracting parties are exposed. Secondly, in defining the 
scope of the obligation, due regard must be given to striking a fair balance between the needs 
of the individual and the general interest. In the socioeconomic arena, the state will be afforded 
a particularly wide margin of appreciation in this regard. Finally, the scope of the positive 
obligation must be such so as to be within the capabilities of the state. Put more simply, positive 
obligations cannot require the state to deliver the impossible. Specifically, in the context of 
socioeconomic rights, the Court has made reference to and endorsed the ‘proviso of the 
possible’ approach, according to which ‘a State cannot be forced to comply with its obligations 
in the framework of social rights if it does not possess the economic means to do so’.28 
Thus, when the state’s compliance with its positive obligations is examined, the prejudice 
to the victim is ‘a necessary, but still an insufficient condition’29 to find that the state was in 
violation of these obligations. The significance of this analysis in relation to the state’s 
socioeconomic obligations is that apart from the circumstances of deprivation the individual 
experiences that may engage her Convention rights, the Court must proceed to establish state 
fault in order to find a violation, namely that the state failed to take those steps that were 
necessary to protect the rightsholder. More specifically, the Court must identify ‘a failure of 
the state that contributed to the prejudice the victim suffered’,30 and/or that there ‘were certain 
supplementary measures which the State could have taken but failed to take, although this 
would not have imposed a disproportionate burden’.31  
                                                          
25 See Vladislava Stoyanova, ‘Causation between State Omission and Harm within the Framework of Positive 
Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2018) 18 Human Rights Law Review pp 309–46. 
26 (App. No. 48787/99, 08 July 2004). 
27 Ibid at [332]. 
28 Da Silva Carvalho Rico v Portugal (dec. App. No. 13341/14, 1 September 2015) at [44]. 
29 See in detail Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) pp 462 
– 518 at 479. 
30 See De Schutter and Ilaşcu and others v Russia and Moldova cited above at [332]. 
31  Ibid. 
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In relation to this second limb of the required test to find a violation, where the Court 
must establish that there was state fault that caused harm to the right, the Court in 
socioeconomic cases affords states a very wide margin of appreciation. If the Court were to 
scrutinise state fault in socioeconomic cases intensely, in order to determine the capacity of the 
state to provide socioeconomic assistance, it would inevitably be drawn into sensitive areas of 
budget (re)allocation. Therefore, it is not surprising that the ECtHR acknowledges that it is out 
of its remit to place vast financial burdens on contracting parties. In the controversial and much-
discussed case of N v UK32 for instance, the Court held that the United Kingdom was not in 
violation of Article 3 ECHR when it deported an asylum seeker that suffered from AIDS-
related illnesses, due to the fact that in his state of origin he would be provided with a 
significantly lower standard of healthcare. The ECtHR stressed on this occasion that, while 
obligations of a social nature emanate from many of the rights protected under the Convention 
and require funds from the state, the ECHR is primarily directed towards the protection of civil 
and political rights.33 The difference in the level of healthcare provided between the two states 
was not a sufficient reason to create an obligation for the state to provide ‘free and unlimited 
health care’34 to all who do not have a legal right to reside in the state. The Court reached its 
conclusion on the scope of the positive duty in this instance by taking into account the 
subjective dimension of the positive obligation to provide healthcare under the Convention. As 
the Court concluded controversially, a different interpretation of the Convention would create 
a particularly heavy burden on the contracting parties.35 Similarly, in Chapman v UK,36 the 
Court stressed that Article 8 ECHR does not guarantee a right to a shelter, due to the fact that 
such a decision would have obvious financial implications and is therefore a political one. For 
this reason, it was held that it did not fall under the Courts’ jurisdiction to establish a 
socioeconomic duty on states to provide everyone with a home.37  
The approach to socioeconomic rights in these judgments demonstrates that the Court is 
not identifying the content of a minimum core of socioeconomic obligations, nor is it 
establishing a pan-European social minimum of welfare protection that states are required to 
deliver. The Court in these instances refuses to extend socioeconomic protection under the 
ECHR on the basis that this may have unintended financial implications that would be too 
onerous on the contracting parties.   
In practice, however, there are instances where the Court has found the state in violation 
of the Convention for failure to deliver on its socioeconomic duties without carrying out an 
exercise of determining whether these duties were within the state’s means. These exceptional 
cases place duties on member states that seem to be objective in nature. The following section 
examines such instances in the Court’s case-law and attempts to assess whether they hold any 
promise in generating a Convention-based social minimum of welfare protection.  
IV.  ‘Vulnerability’ as a means to generate ‘objective’ obligations.  
                                                          
32Ν. v United Kingdom (Νo. 26565/05, 27 May 2008). 
33 Ibid para 44. 
34 Ibid. 
35 In subsequent cases, the Court has been more willing to provide protection to individuals in similar 
circumstances, by lowering the threshold of exceptional circumstances that would warrant state intervention. See 
Paposhvili v Belgium (App. No. 41738/10, 13 December 2016). 
36 (App. Νο. 27238/95, 19 January 2001) para 98. 
37 Ibid. 
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The approach dictated by the nature of positive obligations discussed in the previous section 
may seem to paint a particularly disheartening picture for the capacity of the Court to create an 
absolute baseline of socioeconomic provisions from which all Contracting Parties to the ECHR 
cannot depart. In practice, however, the Court has demonstrated some attempts to create such 
objective duties on states. In order to do so, the Court had to identify a normative justification 
that would allow it to abandon its usual approach to socioeconomic obligations and proceed to 
a finding that an individual’s circumstances were so dire so as to create the minimum core-type 
duty on the state. The key justification the Court has adopted is to focus on the applicant’s 
membership to a vulnerable group. This section argues that while an absolute minimum of 
social protection is not guaranteed to all by the Convention, references to the applicant’s 
vulnerability allow it to guarantee a social minimum to some. The justifications the Court relies 
on to identify these recipients of the social minimum will be discussed in this section. 
The concept of ‘vulnerable groups’ has begun to feature prominently in the ECtHR’s 
case-law. The Court’s allusion to the applicant’s vulnerability is not merely a ‘rhetorical 
flourish’38 but has legal effects.39 It is outside of the scope of the chapter to discuss the use of 
vulnerability in all its forms in the Court’s case law. Instead, the focal point will be the use of 
vulnerability as a means for the Court to justify ‘objective’ socioeconomic duties of the state 
towards the vulnerable group.  
The Court in this context has linked vulnerability to applicants who are ‘wholly 
dependent’40 on State support, and who have found themselves ‘faced with official indifference 
when in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity’.41 Under 
this understanding of vulnerability, the Court has assigned vulnerable status to prisoners,42 
children in a state institution for minors with mental disabilities43 and to asylum-seekers among 
others.44 The key connecting factor seems to be they are all wholly dependent on state support 
for their subsistence. The state’s duties intensify where children asylum-seekers enter a state 
on their own or in cases where the asylum-seeker is travelling with children.45 The obligation 
to protect also increases where the state’s passivity to the needs of the asylum-seeker is the 
cause of, or compounds, their destitution. This would be the case for instance, where the state 
unduly delays responding to an asylum request, thus prolonging the plight of the applicants.46 
For these categories of individuals, the state is expected to provide the necessary 
material assistance to ensure their survival. The Court in these instances does not carry out a 
thorough assessment of the capabilities of the state to secure these provisions. Especially in the 
context of persons in detainment, the Court expressly refuses to engage in a discussion on the 
capacity of the state to offer the rights-holder socioeconomic support. Gerards notes the far-
reaching socioeconomic obligations states owe towards prisoners under the Convention, 
including the provision of ‘glasses, forearm prostheses or dentures, with a special diet or with 
                                                          
38 On this see Lourdes Peroni and Alexandra Timmer, ‘Vulnerable Groups: The Promise of an Emerging Concept 
in European Human Rights Convention Law’ (2013) 11 International Journal Constitutional Law pp 1074. 
39 Ibid.  
40 MSS v Belgium and Greece (App. No. 30696/09, 21 January 2011) para 253. 
41 Ibid.  
42 See for instance G. v. France (App. No. 27244/09 Feb. 23, 2012) paras 72 and 77. 
43 Nencheva v Bulgaria (App. No. 48609/06, 18 June 2013). 
44 MSS v Belgium and Greece (App. No. 30696/09, 21 January 2011) and VM and others v Belgium (App. No. 
60125/11, 7 July 2015). 
45 See VM and others v Belgium (App. No. 60125/11, 7 July 2015). 
46 MSS v Belgium and Greece (App. No. 30696/09, 21 January 2011) para 263. 
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medication’.47 In cases relating to such provisions state objections as to their cost do not sway 
the Court, especially where the Court relies on the vulnerability of prisoners to find Article 3 
ECHR violations. In Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine48 for instance, a case where the applicant 
complained about the very poor prison conditions he was exposed to while on death row, the 
Court took note of that fact that ‘Ukraine encountered serious socio-economic problems’49 and 
that authorities were ‘struggling under difficult economic conditions’.50 This did not persuade 
the Court to alter its approach. The Court held that this ‘lack of resources cannot in principle 
justify prison conditions which are so poor as to reach the threshold of treatment contrary to 
Article 3 of the Convention’.51 This approach leads Gerards to conclude that where the Court 
is examining the rights of individuals in detainment, the  state’s positive obligations ‘are much 
stronger and the Court is much less deferential towards the States where budgetary 
considerations are concerned’.52 According to Judge Sicilianos in his extrajudicial writings, in 
these circumstances where the state has sole responsibility for the well-being of the individual, 
the lines between positive and negative protection become blurred and ‘the Court imposes on 
states a kind of obligation of result’53 rather than one of means.  
 
This underscores a particularly important function of vulnerability. As Bossuyt 
explains, vulnerability lowers the threshold for inhuman or degrading treatment, thus creating 
a link between the deprivation the individual faces and Article 3 ECHR.54 Due to the absolute 
nature of the right, any subsequent discussion on the state’s capacity to respond to these 
obligations is rendered nugatory. 
 
A similar approach is followed where asylum seekers are concerned. In the landmark 
judgment of M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece,55 the ECtHR found Greece in violation of Article 3 
ECHR for the living conditions to which the applicant was exposed to while waiting for his 
asylum request to be processed. The fact that he was left without shelter and material provisions 
was sufficient for the Court to find that his circumstances had reached the minimum level of 
severity required for an Article 3 ECHR violation. The Court reached its conclusion by noting 
the obligations Greece had under EU law56 to provide a minimum of socioeconomic standards 
to asylum seekers. This analysis was complemented by reference to the vulnerability of asylum 
seekers. In subsequent judgments with similar facts, vulnerability was used as the sole basis to 
bring the applicant’s situation into the realm of Article 3 and to justify the Court’s finding of a 
Convention violation.57  
                                                          
47 Janneke Gerards, ‘The ECtHR’s Response to Fundamental Rights Issues Related to Financial and Economic 
Difficulties – the Problem of Compartmentalisation’ (2015) 33 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights pp 284.  
48 (App. No. 38812/97, 29 April 2003). 
49 Ibid para 148. 
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid. 
52 Janneke Gerards, ‘The ECtHR’s Response to Fundamental Rights Issues Related to Financial and Economic 
Difficulties – the Problem of Compartmentalisation’ (2015) 33 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights pp 286. 
53 Alexandros-Linos Sicilianos, ‘The European Court of Human Rights at a time of crisis in Europe’ (2016) 
European Human Rights Law Review pp 124. 
54 Marc Bossuyt, ‘Is the European Court of Human Rights on a slippery slope?’ in Flogaitis, Zwart and Fraser 
(eds.), The European Court of Human Rights and its Discontents (Edward Elgar, 2013) pp 28-29. 
55 (App. No. 30696/09, 21 January 2011). 
56 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum-
seekers in the member States. 
57 See for instance VM and others v Belgium (App. No. 60125/11, 7 July 2015).  
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    The needs of the vulnerable demand an immediate response from the state and thus 
vulnerable status can serve as a guide to states on how to dispense their positive obligations, 
namely to which individuals to give priority for socioeconomic provisions. By bringing 
destitution into the scope of Article 3, the state cannot argue that providing socioeconomic 
assistance would be outside its subjective capabilities. Therefore, this approach fulfils the 
immediacy, completeness and universality requirements discussed in Part 1 of this chapter that 
Tasioulas associates with the social minimum. It does not, however, meet the requirements of 
Waldron’s definition, as it is not a social minimum of provisions that is available to all. It is 
instead only limited to those groups the Court has deemed to be vulnerable. 
This distinction between vulnerable and non-vulnerable individuals in need of social 
assistance could be faulted for leading to unfair results. In M.S.S. for instance, the Court was 
quick to point out that ‘Article 3 cannot be interpreted as obliging the High Contracting Parties 
to provide everyone within their jurisdiction with a home’.58 This clarified that the finding of 
the violation in this case was exceptional and not available to all who were destitute, but instead 
only to members of a vulnerable group.59 Thus, the Courts reliance on ‘vulnerable groups’ has 
a dual function. On the one hand, it increases the state’s obligations to provide material 
assistance to vulnerable groups by allowing the Court to invoke Article 3 ECHR and 
consequently to forego a subjective test of the state’s resource capabilities. On the other hand, 
the ‘vulnerable groups’ construct establishes the limits of this obligation. The duty is only owed 
to the members of vulnerable groups, thus excluding other individuals that may have equally 
pressing socioeconomic needs but are not able to claim membership to a group the Court has 
identified as vulnerable. 
To illustrate this point by way of an example, if we are to imagine two destitute 
individuals, one (A) who is a citizen of the state sleeping rough on the streets, and the other 
(B) an asylum seeker who is exposed to the same levels of deprivation during the time their 
request for asylum is being processed, the Court’s approach would mean that individuals A and 
B would have very different prospects of success before the ECtHR.  For A to successfully 
challenge her destitution on Convention grounds, she must demonstrate that for instance, she 
was discriminated against and unlawfully excluded from a state-run housing scheme, or that 
there were procedural flaws in how her case was dealt with, assuming the state in question 
offers shelters to the homeless in the first place. The ECtHR would most likely afford the state 
a wide margin of appreciation. The hurdle for B to satisfy her socio-economic demands under 
the Convention is much lower. The Court’s justification for this would be that B has no option 
but to rely exclusively on the state for her subsistence. Thus, the scope of the positive 
obligation, the state’s duty to protect, is much more pressing in B’s case. The state’s margin 
will be narrow, and the ECtHR will most likely find B’s treatment to violate the Convention in 
line with the Court’s case law on asylum-seekers. Importantly, this will be an objective duty 
the state must fulfil, and not one that is based on the subjective capabilities of the state. 
Consequently, the same degree of deprivation leads to differing human rights obligations under 
the ECHR as interpreted in the case law of the ECtHR.  
                                                          
58 MSS para 249. 
59 See concurring opinion of Judge Rozakis in MSS.  
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The assumption that A should be more self-reliant and is therefore less deserving of 
protection may be criticised for failing to identify various layers of vulnerability60 or the 
complexities of life that could lead someone to destitution. This aspect of vulnerability as it is 
understood by the ECtHR also explains why this tool to enhance positive obligations has been 
criticised. As commentators have pointed out, the term is exclusionary as it suggests that 
individuals who are not readily identifiable as members of a vulnerable group are viewed as 
‘self-sufficient, independent and autonomous’,61 and concomitantly less worthy of protection.  
One could be tempted to argue that the Court should simply build on its vulnerability 
analysis to include more classes of individuals in its ambit. If vulnerability unlocks state 
obligations to provide a social minimum of welfare assistance, expanding the pool of 
individuals who would qualify as vulnerable would allow the Court to require more from states. 
With this in mind, the following section will address whether expanding the concept of 
vulnerability to encompass a broader range of individuals in need of social assistance would in 
fact be useful. 
V.  From ‘vulnerable groups’ to individual vulnerability: An inflation of vulnerability 
analysis? 
The previous section has argued that the vulnerable status of an individual can be the means to 
make subjective obligations objective and to require the state to fulfil a minimum of the 
individual’s socio-economic needs. This raises a related question. If vulnerability serves such 
a function, and the aforementioned distinctions the Court makes between vulnerable and non-
vulnerable individuals can be criticised for leading to unfair results, should the Court broaden 
the category of those who can lay claim to vulnerability? Prima facie, if the Court were to 
assign vulnerable status to applicants based on their specific needs rather than their membership 
to a group or the level of responsibility the state purportedly has over them, it could 
simultaneously adopt a bolder stance in its socioeconomic jurisprudence. This could allow the 
Court to justify narrowing the margin of appreciation or to demand a greater degree of 
socioeconomic provisions from the respondent states. 
  The Court has clearly not followed an understanding of vulnerability that is linked to 
the specific needs of the applicant.62 As Brandl and Czech confirm, in the ECtHR’s case law 
‘vulnerability is not derived from an applicant’s individual personal circumstances, but from 
his or her affiliation to a group with special needs’.63 The Court may identify various degrees 
of vulnerability within the vulnerable group,64 or recognise ‘double vulnerability’65 where the 
applicant possesses characteristics that classify her under more than one group that has been 
                                                          
60 See especially Martha Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State’ (2010) 60 Emory Law 
Journal pp 251 - 75;  
61 Lourdes Peroni and Alexandra Timmer, ‘Vulnerable Groups: The Promise of an Emerging Concept in European 
Human Rights Convention Law’ (2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law pp 1060. 
62 Alexandra Timmer, ‘A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European Court of Human Rights’ in Fineman 
and Greer (eds), Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics (Routledge, 2013) 
pp152. 
63 Ulrike Brandl and Philip Czech, ‘General and Specific Vulnerability of Protection-Seekers in the EU: Is there 
an Adequate Response to their Needs?’ in Ippolito and Iglesias Sánchez (eds), Protecting Vulnerable Groups: 
The European Human Rights Framework (Hart, 2015) 249. 
64 Alexandra Timmer, ‘A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European Court of Human Rights’ in Fineman 
and Greer (eds), Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics (Routledge, 2013) 
pp 161. 
65 Ibid. 
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assigned vulnerable status. It does not, however, adopt a vulnerability-based analysis where the 
applicant is not a member of one of the vulnerable groups recognised as such in the Court’s 
case law. If the Court were to abandon an understanding of vulnerability that is derived from 
the identity of the applicant, and instead chose to focus on the specific needs of the individual, 
it could, in theory, more confidently proceed to examine the circumstances of deprivation the 
individual is facing, and assess whether these would qualify as circumstances ‘incompatible 
with human dignity’,66 thus building on the approach the Court adopted in its asylum-seeker 
case law.  
  Such a hypothetical approach would find support in the broader literature on 
vulnerability. Fineman firmly rejects the notion of ‘vulnerable groups’, where vulnerability is 
linked to the identity of the individual. For Fineman, vulnerability is ‘universal and constant’ 
due to our embodiment as human beings,67 a shared characteristic rather than one that relates 
only to specific marginalised groups.  
Fineman cautions against the stigmatising effect68 that the ‘vulnerable groups’ construct 
may have and instead argues in favour of building resilience, which is the ‘solution to our 
vulnerability’.69 Under Fineman’s vulnerability analysis, 
 the basis for distinguishing some individuals from better-positioned but equally 
vulnerable individuals in the first instance would revolve around questions of 
access to sufficient resources, with a deficit indicating they lacked the resilience 
that is necessary to address human vulnerability. Significantly, the initial emphasis 
here is on the distribution or allocation of resources and the structures within which 
they are produced. This suggests that the first question to be considered is whether 
institutional, not individual, functioning is inadequate. This inquiry shifts the focus 
to state and social responsibility because it recognizes that a deficit in resources 
often reflects an institutional or societal failing more than an individual one.70 
Therefore, under Fineman’s analysis, the destitute individual A in the example mentioned 
in the previous section should expect the same level of protection as destitute individual B. Her 
lack of ‘resilience’ would not be attributable to her own failings but be viewed as a state failure 
to protect her interests. Therefore, for Fineman, it would be incorrect to assume that she is more 
responsible for her plight than B due to the fact that A is not a member of a ‘vulnerable group’ 
or is not ‘wholly reliant’ on state support in the same way as a prisoner or an asylum-seeker. 
Thus, rather than focusing on the identity of the applicant, the Court could engage in a 
discussion on whether the applicant’s circumstances offend her dignity in a manner that would 
render her vulnerable and trigger Convention protection.   
ECtHR judges have taken some tentative steps in this direction in their extrajudicial 
writings, but such an approach has yet to enter the Court’s analysis. Judge Tulkens, for instance, 
                                                          
66 The Court employed this terminology in MSS at paras 220, 221 and 253. 
67 Martha Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008) 20 Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism pp 1-23. 
68 According to Fineman, ‘labelling some individuals and herding them into ‘populations’ defined as differently 
or particularly vulnerable (and therefore somehow inadequate) stigmatizes those individuals’ see Martha Fineman, 
‘Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality’ (2017) 4 Oslo Law Review pp 133-149, available at 
https://www.idunn.no/oslo_law_review/2017/03/vulnerability_and_inevitable_inequality. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid.  
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argues that ‘[i]t would be unthinkable not to consider that extreme poverty humiliates the 
individual in his own eyes and in the eyes of others and is such as to arouse feelings of fear, 
anguish and inferiority’71 in a manner that would engage Article 3. Additionally Tulkens 
questions whether it would really be ‘so ridiculous to think that if corporal punishment in 
schools is considered to be degrading, the same should apply to the situation of someone who 
‘lives’ in a slum?’72 She does however accept that ‘almost as a matter of necessity, [there must 
be] a certain degree of restraint in applying [this] in practice’.73 
The approach Judge Tulkens recommends has some obvious benefits. It examines the 
impact of extreme poverty on the individual without reference to her membership to a 
vulnerable group. It is instead the feelings of ‘fear, anguish and inferiority’, caused by poverty, 
that could render the individual vulnerable and trigger obligations on the state to provide a 
certain baseline of protection.  
While this analysis may seem attractive as a means for the Court to broaden the 
circumstances where an objective state obligation to protect would be triggered, there are 
important reasons that justify a restrictive understanding of who is vulnerable in the eyes of the 
ECtHR. A needs-based approach to vulnerability must not be interpreted by the Court as 
allowing it to generate onerous demands on the member states. As discussed in the previous 
section, an important function of vulnerability analysis is that it serves as a normative 
justification to allow the Court to narrow what would normally be a wide margin of 
appreciation. Vulnerability ‘operates as a magnifying glass’74 for the state’s duty of protection, 
allowing the Court to avoid the light touch review usually associated with socioeconomic 
rights. Therefore, the nature of vulnerability is exceptional in that it is a tool that exceptionally 
allows the Court to use the Convention as a means to satisfy basic socioeconomic needs. Thus, 
while the Court’s approach to vulnerability can be criticised, if the proverbial net of 
vulnerability were cast too wide to include a much broader range of individuals, this tool would 
be in danger of losing its exceptional character that provides the Court with the justification to 
make the leap from subjective duties to objective socioeconomic demands. Therefore, any 
development in vulnerability analysis must be cognizant of the limits placed on the Court by 
its nature as a subsidiary human rights body and the fact that the Convention primarily protects 
civil and political rights. An inflation of the concept would call into question the Court’s 
legitimacy to interpret the Convention in a manner that creates duties far exceeding those the 
contracting parties agreed to respect and protect.  
A potential solution to this concern could be for the Court to reconcile both approaches 
to vulnerability in its reasoning. While relying primarily on the concept of vulnerable groups, 
the Court’s analysis could more deftly engage in a discussion on the circumstances of the 
applicant and how these would trigger the state’s duty to provide a minimum of protection. The 
fact that a person falls within a recognised vulnerable group could be viewed by the Court as a 
strong indicator of need, thus requiring the state to intervene. It would not, however, be the 
                                                          
71 Judge Tulkens, ‘Seminar to mark the opening of the judicial year of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(Strasbourg, 25 January 2013) available at http://echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20130125_Tulkens_ENG.pdf 
at para 19. 
72 Ibid at 20. 
73 Ibid.  
74 See Ana Beduschi, ‘Vulnerability on trial: protection of migrant children’s rights in the jurisprudence of 
international human rights courts’ (2018) 36 Boston University International Law Journal pp 56. 
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sole indicator. By further exploring the links between the applicant’s situation of poverty and 
the state’s duty to protect, the Court could incrementally75 develop a more coherent and 
consistent test to determine the circumstances under which the state would be required to 
provide a social minimum of welfare. This could open up state responsibilities towards 
individuals who would not be considered members of a vulnerable group. This approach 
secures the socioeconomic privileges vulnerable groups currently enjoy, but also allows the 
Court to slowly build its jurisprudence in the direction of specifying a certain minimum of 
protection that would be available to all who would need it.  
The introduction of clearer and more coherent principles that link poverty to the state’s 
duty to protect, would allow the Court to draw on these principles when the applicant’s 
destitution reaches a level of severity that is incompatible with human dignity. This would not 
constitute a significant departure from the Court’s existing legal reasoning. In obiter statements 
the Court has already identified that ‘a complaint about a wholly insufficient amount of pension 
and the other social benefits may, in principle, raise an issue under Article 3’.76 A similar 
approach was adopted in Budina v Russia77 where the Court in obiter statements linked 
destitution to Article 2 ECHR.78 Building on this approach would ensure that such statements 
are not merely ‘teasing promises’79 the Court makes obiter and is unlikely to fulfil, but can 
instead become the basis for a social minimum of welfare protection under the ECHR. 
VI. Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to examine the Court’s socioeconomic case law through the prism 
of positive and minimum core obligations. It has argued that the nature of positive obligations 
as obligations that are subjective to each state and are obligations of means, suggesting that the 
Court may be limited in its capacity to establish a social minimum of welfare protection in 
absolute terms. The chapter then proceeded to examine an important tool the Court has relied 
on to require states, regardless of their resources, to intervene to protect individuals from 
destitution. The Court has established objective duties of protection in circumstances where 
the applicant is vulnerable and relies exclusively on the state for material support. The Court’s 
case law on socio-economic provisions for asylum seekers is a particularly useful example of 
this approach. While the designation of a group as vulnerable and deserving of material 
assistance with priority against others may raise concerns, the exceptional nature of 
vulnerability allows the Court to expand the state’s duties, thus overcoming the limitations 
inherent in positive obligations. While it would be useful for the Court to develop its 
understanding of vulnerability and to focus on the needs of the specific applicant rather than 
on her identity, the exceptional character of the vulnerability must be safeguarded. Therefore, 
an approach that reconciles the vulnerable groups approach with the applicant’s individual 
                                                          
75 On the Court’s use of incrementalism see Janneke Gerards, ‘Margin of Appreciation and Incrementalism in the 
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2018) 18 Human Rights Law Review pp 495-515. 
76 Larioshina v Russia (App.No. 56869/00, dec, 23 April 2002). 
77 (App. No. 45603/05, dec, 18 June 2009). 
78 On these cases see Dimitrios Kagiaros, ‘In search of a ‘social minimum’: Austerity and destitution in the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2019) 25 European Public Law (forthcoming, on file with the author). 
79 Colm O'Cinneide, A Modest Proposal: Destitution, State Responsibility and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (August 30, 2008). Available on SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1370241 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1370241. 
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needs would be a promising path for the Court to follow in the direction of establishing a social 
minimum of welfare provisions.  
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